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NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL THEORY
CORINNE BLALOCK*
I
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the legal academy has begun to tell itself the story of how
and why legal theory was marginalized in the wake of critical legal studies and
the theory debates of the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the volume of work written
on the subject and the many anxieties expressed about the (im)possibility of
critical legal theory’s revival, the narratives of what led to this juncture are
deeply conflicted. There is even debate about what precisely has been lost.
Some argue that it is just the very visible, radical critical legal studies movement
1
that has passed from the legal theory scene. Others contend the leftist project
2
more generally has run out of steam. And still others assert that theory has
been marginalized within the humanities and social sciences as well, making the
3
disappearance of legal theory just one instance of this larger trend.
4
What seems beyond dispute is that “legal theory is out.” Comparing the
current intellectual climate with the pervasive interest in theoretical approaches
in the preceding decades, Duncan Kennedy remarks that “legal theory has lost
the fairly central place it held in legal consciousness and legal discourse in the
period from the late fifties up to the nineties . . . . It has been eclipsed, in a sense
Copyright © 2014 by Corinne Blalock.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* I am grateful to Guy Charles, Benjamin Douglas, Abraham Geil, Jack Knight, Ralf Michaels,
Jed Purdy, and Dana Remus for their insightful comments.
1. See, e.g., JAMES R. HACKNEY, LEGAL INTELLECTUALS IN CONVERSATION: REFLECTIONS ON
THE CONSTRUCTION OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (2012) (In the introduction to
his book of interviews with the seminal figures in legal theory, James Hackney contends that the critical
tradition is alive and well and that it has merely moved beyond the abstract theory debates of the 1970s
and 1980s and into a more pragmatic orientation that is less visible.); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal
Theory (without modifiers) in the United States, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 99, 107 (2005) (arguing that it is merely
the spectacle of CLS that has disappeared and many critical scholars are still actively writing and
teaching).
2. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, Critical Legal Studies as Spiritual Practice, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 515, 528
(2008) (“[I]nfluencing the dissipation of the movements themselves was the collapse of socialism and
the Marxism that had supported it, which for 150 years provided the principal metaphor for the morally
transcendent communal horizon against which the shortcomings of the present society had been
measured.”); William H. Simon, Fear and Loathing of Politics in the Legal Academy, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 175, 179 (2001) (arguing that “things might have been different [if] there [had] been a strong
liberal or left political movement open to alternative programmatic thinking”).
3. See, e.g., HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 111 (quoting Austin Sarat). Austin Sarat, one of the
central figures in the Law and Society movement, states that legal theory’s decline should be
understood as part of the larger death of metatheory. Id.
4. Id. at 43 (quoting Duncan Kennedy).

BLALOCK_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX

72

12/3/2014 2:08 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 77:71

5

even discredited.” The theoretical conversations that defined those final
6
decades of intellectual foment were driven largely by the “crits” —an umbrella
term that covers three distinct groups of scholars: critical legal studies (CLS)
7
8
scholars, critical race theory (CRT) scholars, and feminist legal theorists. CLS
emerged as a loosely defined movement of young leftist legal academics,
9
educated at Harvard and Yale Law Schools in the late 1960s. CRT and feminist
legal theory emerged in the 1980s to address the notable gaps and biases
10
regarding race and gender in both the dominant discourse and CLS. These
three critical movements challenged the law’s neutrality and critiqued the
discourse within the legal academy: a form of left-of-center liberalism that
professed faith in rights, equality, and the courts as mechanisms for progressive
11
social change. Though one can certainly debate the effectiveness or validity of
12
these critiques, it is undeniable that they took aim at the heart of liberalism.
And yet, in recent years, scholarship that continues in these modes does not
appear to have the same impact. The narratives accounting for this loss of
vitality are as contradictory as they are ubiquitous—“victory through
incorporation” exists alongside “failure to provide an alternative.” Each
proposes that something has changed—the legal academy, the critical project,
or the political climate—but all assume that legal liberalism is still the relevant
paradigm.
However, neoliberalism, not liberalism, is now the dominant paradigm of
legitimacy. And one cannot understand the narratives of decline, nor the decline
itself, without first accounting for the rise of neoliberalism. Moreover, by not
recognizing neoliberalism’s logic, critical legal scholars fail to challenge it and
risk further implicating law and legal theory in neoliberalism’s legitimation.
Under neoliberalism, the measures and values of the market are used to
index the success of the state and its citizens. Diverging from the constitutional

5. Id.
6. This period also saw the emergence of the “law and ___” movements, including law and
society, law and literature, law and psychology, and, of course, law and economics, all of which
contributed to the robust intellectual climate.
7. CRT emerged in the mid-1980s as a critique of liberalism’s cautious approach to racial equality
and its blind eye toward issues of institutional racism. CRT also aimed to expose the complicity of law
in the continued subordination of racial minorities. Some of the more prominent scholars associated
with the movement include: Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic, Derrick Bell, Angela Harris, Cheryl
Harris, Patricia Williams, and Kimberle Williams Krenshaw.
8. Feminist legal theory also emerged in the 1980s in part in response to the limits of equality
advocacy in the fight against gender subordination. Prominent feminist legal scholars include: Janet
Halley, Catharine MacKinnon, Katharine Bartlett, Mari Matsuda, and Martha Fineman.
9. The founding and central members of the movement are identified as Duncan Kennedy, David
Trubek, Mark Tushnet, Mark Kelman, Karl Klare, Morton Horowitz, Peter Gabel, and Roberto Unger.
10. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 504–09 (1995) (describing
the tensions and divergence in method among CLS, CRT, and feminist legal scholars).
11. HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 29 (Duncan Kennedy asserts that “[CLS] was not about fighting
Nixon; it was about being against the people in legal academia and in the culture in general who are the
dominant intellectual forces and were way to the left of Nixon. The idea is, the word is, radical.”).
12. See infra Part II.
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ideal that state power derives from consent by and representation of the people,
the state’s authority is both founded on and progressively limited to its ability to
guarantee proper conditions for economic activity and individual prosperity.
Correspondingly, the democratic will of the people is cast as irrelevant to
economic affairs and as harmful if mobilized to intervene in pursuit of social
goals. As Margaret Thatcher declared, in perhaps the most famous articulation
13
of neoliberal ideology, “There is no such thing as society.” The market-model
of choice and efficiency is extended to the level of the individual. Marketinflected cost-benefit analysis figures all human pursuits as “conducted
according to a calculus of utility, benefit, or satisfaction against a
microeconomic grid of scarcity, supply and demand, and moral value14
neutrality.”
In failing to recognize neoliberalism, the narratives of decline provide useful
insights into understanding it. First, reading the narratives symptomatically
illustrates just how deeply the logic of neoliberalism has penetrated the legal
discourse. Second, it illustrates the consequences for critical legal theory of
failing to identify the shift produced by neoliberalism. It also offers a way into
an important conversation regarding the failure of legal discourse generally to
address neoliberalism. And finally, examining these narratives forces one to
recognize that neoliberalism is not strictly a conservative ideology, but a
15
postpolitical discourse that progressive scholars also inhabit.
This article proceeds in seven parts. Following the introduction, part II
describes the crits’ central critiques and their relationship to liberalism. Part III
briefly recounts the narratives that the legal academy has constructed to explain
(away) the marginalization of critical legal theory, showing how each provides a
piece of the puzzle yet fails to fully account for the whole.
Part IV provides a more substantive definition of neoliberalism and uses the
concept of hegemony to show how neoliberal thought has become
simultaneously ubiquitous and largely invisible. Part V uses this understanding
of neoliberalism to recast the narratives of decline, showing how each is
symptomatic of neoliberalism’s rationality. Part VI illustrates how the
prescriptions for countering legal theory’s marginalization fit within the logic of
neoliberalism, undermining their power and relevancy. Part VII concludes with
an argument about the need to develop a critique of neoliberalism internal to
law and legal theory moving forward.

13. Margaret Thatcher, Interview for Woman’s Own (Sept. 23, 1987), available at
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689.
14. Wendy Brown, Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, in EDGEWORK: CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 37, 40 (2005).
15. Highlighting the postpolitical nature of neoliberalism’s rationality, radical leftist scholars from
Duncan Kennedy to Catharine MacKinnon advocate for law and economics as a methodology for the
left. See HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 30, 140.
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II
THE CRITS AND THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM
16

The crits took aim at “democratic liberalism” as a model of state power
and critiqued, as its essential adjunct, “legal liberalism,” or faith in the ability of
17
the law and the courts to at once transcend and discipline politics. There were
numerous critical veins running through the crits’ scholarship, each gaining
theoretical traction by demystifying and directly challenging some central
aspect of liberalism, but four dominated. CLS shared the first three veins in
common with CRT and feminist legal scholarship. These included the
indeterminacy critique, the refutation of the law–politics distinction, and the
debunking of the myth of the autonomous legal subject. The final vein, an
emphasis on class relations, material inequality, and Marxist theory, was largely
unique to CLS.
In the first critical vein, the crits demonstrated that legal principles could be
used to justify almost any outcome such that judges could not reach decisions
based on legal doctrine alone; their scholarship illustrated this by using the
same legal principles to arrive at different outcomes. The “indeterminacy
critique,” as it was referred to, directly countered the liberal model of judicial
reasoning according to which judges merely applied the law and precedent so as
18
to arrive at a single incontrovertible answer.
The second critical assertion—that “law is politics” and not a wholly
separate realm or a truly distinct form of reasoning—likewise took aim at the
inherent assumptions of liberalism. Liberal theory grounds the state’s
legitimacy in democratic accountability and the ability of individuals to come
together, as equals, to institute a collective vision of the common good. Insofar
19
as liberalism also offers itself as “a government of laws, and not of men,” it
entails a model of legal, as well as political, legitimacy. Legal liberalism is the
corresponding belief that the courts are the means by which the values of
liberty, autonomy, and rights-based equality can be preserved when impinged
20
by the political system. Although democratic accountability is heralded as the
legitimating force behind the Constitution itself, the courts’ legitimacy is
established by other means: through their separation from politics. Legal
liberalism thus places law above politics and culture. The crits rebuked the

16. I use the term “crits” to demarcate the scholarship that was being done during the 1970s and
1980s in critical legal theory by CLS, CRT, and feminist legal scholars. I refer to legal scholars currently
working in the critical vein simply as “critical legal scholars.” Likewise, I use “critical legal theory” to
indicate the practice of critique more generally, not the historically specific moment of the crits.
17. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 1–10 (1998) (defining
legal liberalism in the wake of the Warren Court as centered around the belief that the courts were a
primary and effective means of furthering progressive values of liberty and equality). See also id. at 85–
86 (describing CLS scholars’ critique of legal liberalism and the rights discourse).
18. Pierre Schlag, Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LEGAL HISTORY 295, 296 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009).
19. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
20. See KALMAN, supra note 17, at 2.
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embrace of these ideas as apologias for the status quo and argued that these
ideas were complicit in masking the deep injustices created through law. They
illustrated that law was political in the sense that it was neither neutral nor
objective, but instead embodied a particular set of beliefs and furthered a
particular set of interests—white, male, heteronormative, ruling-class values—
21
that actually perpetuated the subordination of other groups in society. It is
precisely through law’s claims of neutrality and autonomous choice, the crits
argued, that racial and gendered hierarchies are maintained. One of the crits’
most powerful critiques, therefore, was to assert the materialism that the liberal
discourse elided. They exposed the distance between formal and substantive
equality, and the degree to which legal formalism and the rights discourse
22
papered over and perpetuated these forms of subordination.
Relatedly, the third critical vein of crit scholarship challenged the legal
discourse’s claims of universality, including the figure of the autonomous,
23
rational legal subject. Liberal subjects, the crits argued, are determined by
structures outside of their control. They are divided, gendered, sexualized, and
24
racialized, and understand and experience the law as such.
Finally, CLS in particular foregrounded law’s role in the creation and
maintenance of class inequality and, in so doing, took up the legacy of Robert
Hale and the more radical legal realists to illustrate that economic relations of
25
power were not only maintained but also created by the law. From Hale, CLS
took the idea that every private right should be viewed as entailing a
corresponding deprivation and therefore constituting a public regulation as
26
much as any legislative act of taxation or redistribution.
III
NARRATIVES OF THE DECLINE OF LEGAL THEORY
Accounts of legal theory’s apparent decline are varied and contradictory.
They differ not only over whether critical legal theory “won” or “lost” but also
over whether the dissipation of its more radical elements is something to be
grateful for or the source of its decline. In this part, I briefly sketch four of the
more prominent narratives, illustrating why each appears to be incomplete.

21. Schlag, supra note 18, at 296–98.
22. See, e.g., Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Review, 62 MINN L. REV. 1049 (1978).
23. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327
(1991).
24. See Jack M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of
Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105 (1993–94); James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible?: The Postmodern
Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991) (highlighting the need to problematize the
subjective experience of law).
25. See generally Kennedy, supra note 23.
26. Schlag, supra note 18, at 297.
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A. We Won, Or, Victory Through Incorporation
One account is a story of triumph: success and institutionalization stole the
momentum away from the political and intellectual struggles embodied by the
27
crits. This narrative of success is a particularly common articulation of the fate
of what Mark Tushnet terms “Critical Legal Theory without modifiers,” a
28
phrase he employs to exclude critical race and feminist scholars. According to
Tushnet, the critical insights of CLS have been rendered less visible as a distinct
form of scholarship because they have been embraced by the legal academy at
29
large. He argues that nostalgia for the earlier, more radical iterations of these
critical projects is misguided because the muted forms they now take are closer
30
to CLS’s true message. The inflammatory rhetoric of the earlier moment was
mere strategy for attracting attention to a critical approach formerly wholly
31
outside the mainstream. In the wake of institutional victory, the crits have
been able to do away with this stratagem and still retain the true goals of these
projects.
Tushnet’s narrative at first appears credible. With the notable exception of
the more radical conservative theories, some degree of indeterminacy in law is
32
indeed widely accepted as self-evident. Therefore, he is right to claim that law
is no longer thought of as something wholly separate from politics. Most
contemporary legal theories recognize politics as influencing legal outcomes
within a zone of discretion created by the law itself (although debates persist
over the precise size of the gap for such discretion left by texts and precedent).
In light of this change, the victory narrative seems like a plausible
explanation, but it leaves one with an uncomfortable question: if the crits
“won,” why does that victory feel so hollow?
If one delves deeper into Tushnet’s particular claims of victory, it becomes
readily apparent just how hollow this supposed “victory” is. Tushnet begins his
27. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1; Peter Goodrich, Sleeping with the Enemy: An Essay on the
Politics of Critical Legal Studies in America, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 389, 390–92 (1993) (Asserting a distinct
and more pessimistic narrative about the effects of “success,” Goodrich argues that CLS appeared and
subsequently disappeared as “the fashionable pedagogy of an institutional elite or high clergy,
concerned not so much with a culture of the Left as with the preservation and reproduction of its own
institutional place and status.”).
28. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 107. In essence, “critical legal theory without modifiers” is just the
school of thought I have designated as CLS.
29. Id. at 100.
30. Tushnet all but apologizes for the radicalness of CLS’s claims, stating that they were
“[o]verstated, I suspect, to get people’s attention and dislodge them from [their] nervous complacency.”
Id. at 105 n.23.
31. Id. See also Louis Michael Siedman, Critical Constitutionalism Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
575, 591 (2006) (“Critical constitutionalism in the twentieth century was often marked by a kind of
brash in-your-faceism . . . [which] was perhaps necessary to shake up a sleepy constitutional
establishment. In any event, whether because we are all older and wiser, or whether because the
situation has changed, this rhetoric does not seem necessary now.”).
32. See generally Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988)
(highlighting the extent to which almost all major schools of thought in the legal academy accept the
limits of formalism).
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argument with the claim that the CLS principle “law is politics” has been
accepted, only to subsequently qualify that it has been accepted in a “scaledback” form, and then ultimately to retreat to the position that the commonly
held belief that “courts and legislatures mix arguments of principle and
arguments of policy in somewhat different proportions” is “not inconsistent
33
with the critical legal theorists’ early formulations.” The absence of explicit
inconsistency is hardly a powerful claim of incorporation.
Furthermore, to claim victory for the crits based on the incorporation of the
indeterminacy critique is to reduce CLS to legal realism—and not to the radical
realism of Felix Cohen and Robert Hale, but to the broad legal realism that also
includes law and economics and other theoretical movements toward which
CLS originally positioned itself in opposition. Only the first of these forms of
legal realism focuses on law’s role as an instrument of class power. Notably, in
crafting this narrative of success and incorporation, Tushnet does not mention
CLS’s focus on class and material inequality, despite its prominence among the
34
scholars “without modifiers.” He has to skirt the issue in order to maintain his
claim of incorporation.
This tendency to conflate CLS’s project with legal realism in a way that
eschews the critique of class relations is not Tushnet’s alone; claims of victory
for critical legal theory are frequently tied to the oft-quoted mantra “we are all
legal realists now.” Meanwhile, class has completely fallen out of the theoretical
conversation. Although critical race theory and feminist legal scholarship
continue to foreground issues of race and gender within legal scholarship, issues
of class are not incorporated in the theoretical discourse but relegated to the
clinics in the form of “poverty law.” This signifies a dominant understanding
that poverty is a problem to be addressed through policy and advocacy, not
through structural changes in legal thought. Therefore, to see CLS as “winning”
requires thinking about CLS’s projects only formally while ignoring that the
substance of these projects has not been taken up. In light of this limitation on
any claim of victory, it is perhaps unsurprising that the most common narrative
of what happened to the crits is a story of failure.
B. Failure, Or, Mired In Nihilism
In direct contradiction to Tushnet’s story of success and incorporation is the
more prominent narrative of failure. The crits’ failure is accounted for at three
levels of generality in the narratives of decline: at the level of CLS, at the level
of theory as such, and at the level of the leftist political imaginary (both inside
35
and outside the legal academy). At each level, the critical legal project is

33. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 107.
34. See generally id.
35. One can see all three levels of this analysis in Philip Bobbitt’s recent characterization of the
fate of CLS:
[CLS] began as a Marxist movement just when Marxist regimes were being dismantled, wall
by wall, barbed wire and all, in revulsion by those very persons they claimed to serve . . . . CLS
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characterized as unable to escape the negative mode of critique to offer a
generative alternative.
The narrowest articulation asserts that CLS disappeared because of its
36
ultimately sterile commitment to a negative mode of critique. Its
disappearance was inevitable according to some because critical legal
scholarship simply did not, and arguably could not, provide an answer to the
37
question, “What would you put in its place?” And so the story goes, the legal
academy eventually tired of CLS’s relentless critique of liberalism’s
contradictions and power relations.
At the next level of generality, the decline is characterized as
disillusionment, not with legal theory specifically, but with theory as such to
provide alternatives. In other words, the decline of legal theory is seen as
another casualty of the more general death of metatheory in the postmodern
38
era. Unlike earlier iterations of the radical legal tradition, the crits did not
39
ground their critiques in a systematizing alternative vision of law. Even the
critical project itself sought to undermine the idea that the solution would be
found through theory—that it might lie just beyond the next hermeneutic bend.
Poststructuralist theory, in which many of the crits’ projects were grounded,
could not make any sort of claim without immediately undercutting it through
40
critique, and so it ultimately descended into (un)critical nihilism.
At the most general level, this entrenchment in negativity is seen as bound
up with a historical crisis of the leftist political imaginary at the end of the
twentieth century. After the fall of communism, the story goes, the left was
incapable of imagining an alternative to the model of democratic market-

then attempted to transform itself through dalliances with existentialism, decisionism,
structuralism, and eventually postmodernism, chasing the avant garde and arriving only to
find its new partner was already passé.
Philip C. Bobbitt, Age of Consent, 123 YALE L.J. 2334, 2356 (2014).
36. HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 231 (interviewing Jules Coleman) (Legal philosopher Jules
Coleman remarks, “Critical legal studies died because nihilism only takes you so far. You have to have
something that you stand for as opposed to all the things that you stand against.”).
37. Richard Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 779, 780 (1992).
38. HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 111 (interviewing Austin Sarat) (Austin Sarat states that in
explaining the decline “you can generalize beyond the legal academy. It’s the death of meta-theory. It’s
the exhaustion of meta-theory. There are no more Foucaults and Derridas, who everybody’s reading,
everybody’s thinking about.”).
39. Adam Gearey, Anxiety and Affirmation: Critical Legal Studies and the Critical “Tradition(s)”,
31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 592–93 (2006) (CLS was philosophically rooted in the works of
Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, and Levinas, none of which grounded a totalizing
alternative vision for law offered at an earlier moment by the Marxist and existentialist traditions.).
40. Paul Carrington famously claimed critical legal scholars “had an ethical duty” to take their
nihilistic scholarship and “depart the law school.” Kalman, supra note 17, at 121. See also Paul D.
Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) ("The professionalism and
intellectual courage of lawyers . . . . cannot abide . . . the embrace of nihilism . . . . Teaching cynicism
may, and perhaps probably does, result in the learning of the skills of corruption: bribery and
intimidation. In an honest effort to proclaim a need for revolution, nihilist teachers are more likely to
train crooks than radicals.").
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41

capitalism that had been the object of the crits’ critique. This inability to
imagine an alternative—experienced by the left as a cessation of progress and
as an inability to escape the realities of the present moment—is oftentimes
42
referred to as the “end of history.”
The confluence of these layers of negativity admittedly makes it easy to
dismiss the crits as victims of postmodern and leftist disillusionment. However,
43
one could argue that the crits did, in fact, offer alternatives. But even setting
that aside, one should hesitate before accepting this narrative of failure as
conclusive. Is the legal academy really prepared to accept that critical insights
about the legal structure “lack significance and are just not meaningful if [they]
44
don’t propose some means of escape from those underlying structures?”
One should challenge the idea that offering a normative alternative is the
45
goal and measure of legal theory (and of CLS in particular). The demand for
an alternative can be seen as part of the devaluation of the critical project and
46
part of the paradigm that the crits were attempting to subvert. Moreover, there
is an inherent absurdity to the premise that, in order to critique the current
paradigm (i.e., liberalism or law), one has to be able to provide an alternative to
law or liberalism itself.
C. Specialization Or Balkanization?
CLS was the first of the critical fields to emerge, but it was followed closely
by the splintering off of CRT and feminist legal theory. This differentiation into
three distinct fields has been given two distinct valences by scholars narrating
the crits’ decline. The negative valence, which I term the “balkanization
narrative,” focuses on the primary rupture between CLS, CRT, and feminist
legal theory as destroying the critical mass necessary for a viable leftist critical
movement to continue. The positive valence, which I term the “specialization
narrative,” asserts that the division of the critical projects into subdisciplines
41. Joanne Conaghan, The Left: In Memoriam?, N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 455, 455 (2007)
(“It is popular nowadays to view the left as a hangover from a bygone era, a politics that collapsed
along with the Berlin wall and that, like Humpty Dumpty, can never be put together again.”).
42. “End of history” is a characterization popularized by neoconservative political scientist Francis
Fukuyama who argued that liberal democracy was the end point of human history, and that even
though other forms of society would persist, after the fall of communism they could no longer maintain
“their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society.” FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). This insight about the apparent
closing of the historical horizon after the fall of communism was also taken seriously on the left,
especially in the Marxist tradition. See generally Perry Anderson, The Ends of History, in A ZONE OF
ENGAGEMENT (1992).
43. See Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of Nightmares and
Noble Dreams, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2240–41 (1996) (pushing back against the familiar critique that CLS
failed to provide concrete constructive alternatives, using the work of Duncan Kennedy and William
Simon to support this claim but also listing the work of many others).
44. Fischl, supra note 37, at 800.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 802 (“[T]he question itself presupposes virtually every assumption about law and legal
scholarship that [CLS was] attempting to bring to the surface and to call into question.”).
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and their movement into doctrinal areas of law has merely given the illusion of
decline while actually representing a proliferation of theory.
1. Balkanization
CRT and feminist legal theory developed in part as a reaction to the silences
47
regarding race and gender in the supposed radical legal discourse of CLS.
According to the balkanization narrative, the internal divisions and
interpersonal hostilities among CLS scholars, feminist theorists, and critical race
scholars led to infighting and ultimately to the destruction of the only hope for a
48
viable legal left. Fueling this narrative was the spectacle of some of the early
conflicts and divisions that played out at conferences and between the pages of
49
prominent law journals.
This balkanization narrative does not explain the full extent of the perceived
decline. If the introduction of CRT and feminist legal theory is what killed CLS,
why do CRT and feminist scholars also lament the declining relevance of their
theoretical projects? In contrast to CLS, critical race and feminist legal scholars
still have an institutional presence in the legal academy, albeit a narrowly
circumscribed one, with most law schools incorporating race and gender classes
into their curriculums. Despite this institutional incorporation, scholars in these
50
fields claim that there has been a “brain drain” over the last twenty years. For
instance, Janet Halley, a prominent feminist legal scholar, remarks in her book
(in which she advocates “taking a break from feminism”) that “women
complain to [her] that academic feminism has lost its zing [and that many of the]
51
key intellectual figures in feminism have decamped to other endeavors.”
Furthermore, Richard Posner, despite working in law and economics (the
school of thought that emerged whole, and arguably triumphant, from this era),
52
also identified this sense that legal theory generally has lost its vibrancy.
Therefore, these divisions among the crits clearly do not account for the whole
47. DUXBURY, supra note 10, at 504–09. According to many accounts of this rupture, including
Duxbury’s, CRT’s split centered on disagreement with CLS’s rights critique and the desire for scholars
of color to hold onto the legacy of civil rights movement. Richard Delgado, a prominent CRT theorist,
commented that the average CLS scholar “has little use for rights . . . [r]arely is he the victim of
coercion, revilement or contempt.” Id. at 505 (citing Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does
Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 305–06 (1987)).
48. Admittedly, this balkanization narrative is more often focused on the fate of CLS than legal
theory generally or even critical legal theory.
49. For example, “[t]he 1995 conference on CLS and class at Georgetown (jointly sponsored by
Georgetown and American) ended with various walkouts, over disputes between CLS and Critical
Race Theory.” ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 115 n.33 (2011).
There was also a public and acrimonious dispute between Mark Tushnet and Gary Peller in the pages
of the Georgetown Law Review. See Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81
GEO. L.J. 251 (1992) (offering a critique of identity-based scholarship); Gary Peller, The Discourse of
Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313 (1992) (defending identity-based scholarship); Mark
Tushnet, Reply, 81 GEO. L.J. 343 (1992) (criticizing the defense).
50. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 340
(2006).
51. Id.
52. HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 60.
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story.
2. Specialization
The positive valence of the differentiation narrative asserts that, although
legal theory appears to have receded, the theoretical projects have simply
particularized by moving into doctrinal scholarship and various theoretical
subfields. Accordingly, those that perceive a decline are merely mistaking the
death of “grand” legal theory for the death of legal theory more generally; the
decline of legal theory as a stand-alone discipline does not entail the decreased
relevance of theoretical methods to legal scholarship. On the contrary, this
specialization narrative contends that theory is more relevant now than it was
during its highly visible period because it is being brought directly into
conversation with discussions of legal doctrine and therefore not subject to the
53
charge of being “merely academic” exercise. In essence, critical scholars may
have “decamped,” but they took their theories with them.
James Hackney Jr. offers a characteristic example of this narrative in the
introduction to a recent collection of interviews he conducted with the central
54
figures in legal theory about the current state of the field. Hackney asserts that
the proliferation of fields has indeed undermined the lively debates of the 1970s
and 1980s, but only insofar as theoretical conversations have become selfcontained as each subfield is now equipped with its own journals, conferences,
and internal debates (not confronted with and perhaps not even aware of the
55
theoretical debates internal to another subfield). He argues that metatheories
necessarily conflicted and confronted one another because they were all laying
claim to the same theoretical terrain. Now each theoretical enterprise merely
concerns itself with its own clearly defined terrain and none is claiming
transcendent status. Hackney, therefore, attributes the perception of theory’s
decline to a lack of interchange now that each theoretical subfield has found its
56
niche.
Beyond the evolution of subfields, Hackney argues that this lack of debate
can be further explained by the fact that theoretical projects have become
internal to doctrinal areas of law (which were traditionally viewed as separate
from legal theory in the legal academy). Hackney describes the current status of
legal theory as “like a toolkit” available within doctrinal areas of law, as
57
opposed to constituting a separate jurisprudential conversation. In this
account, the crits have just concretized and particularized their scholarship by
developing praxis as opposed to totalizing theories—their theoretical debates
are now internal to their doctrinal area but all the more forceful and relevant
because of it.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44.

BLALOCK_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX

82

12/3/2014 2:08 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 77:71

Hackney’s account is appealing, but it begs the question of how to define
critical legal theory itself. Are these subfields and only-as-applied iterations
really a preservation of the critical legal project? Or are they something else
entirely? Duncan Kennedy takes up Hackney’s metaphor of the “toolkit” to
respond. The transformation of theories into “tools,” Kennedy argues, indicates
that once vibrant and generative theoretical debates have been reduced to
reified forms that can be invoked instrumentally—divorced from their context
58
and nuance. Extending Hackney’s metaphor, Kennedy adds sardonically that
in today’s legal academy “it’s not necessary to be particularly proficient with
59
any of the tools.”
D. Legal Theory Lost Its Way
For others, the decline of legal theory is less a question of legal theory
60
having won or lost than it is of it having lost its way. These scholars, many of
whom were allied with the crits, argue for an internal cause of decline: the
critical legal projects evolved in such a way that they lost their radical or
normative edge and, as a result, fail to meaningfully challenge the status quo.
For example, Robin West contends that critical legal scholars, due to an
overzealous and exclusionary preoccupation with the theories of Michel
Foucault, became too focused on the critique of the “identity-based” and “left61
centrist” projects and regrettably deemphasized state power. Most damning in
West’s opinion is that this Foucauldian preoccupation precluded legal scholars
from making moral claims, and consequently critical legal scholarship has failed
62
to challenge the dominant modes of power. In direct contrast to Tushnet’s
claim that the radical rhetoric fell away to reveal the true stakes and nature of
the crits’ project, West argues that it is precisely because critical legal theory
63
abandoned its radical and utopic orientation that it lost its vitality. Peter Gabel
echoes West’s concerns, indicting CLS for having “lost track of [its] spiritual
64
and moral foundation.”
On one level, I agree: critical legal scholarship has lost its way—schools of
thought and theoretical movements that once appeared vibrant no longer do.
The error, however, was not in deviating from the clearly radical path, as West
claims, but in continuing to stay on the same path as the world around critical
legal theory changed.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 2, at 528 (“CLS ‘stopped,’ or perhaps ‘paused,’ about fifteen years
ago because it lost track of this spiritual and moral foundation.”).
61. ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 116–17 (2011).
62. Id. at 165 (“Foucault’s broad claim regarding the omnipresence of power is what eventually
emasculated the moral critique.”)
63. Id. at 154–56.
64. Gabel, supra note 2, at 528.
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IV
NEOLIBERALISM AND HEGEMONY
The change that legal theory failed to recognize was the rise of
65
neoliberalism. The rule of law under neoliberalism is not designed to allow
individuals to enact a collective vision of society; rather, it is first and foremost
66
designed to enable individuals to plan their actions according to market logic.
In this part, I offer a brief definition of neoliberalism, highlighting the ways in
which it redefines legal legitimacy and other concepts central to political
liberalism and the legal discourse. I then argue that neoliberalism is now
hegemonic—it is not one theoretical account among many but, like liberalism
before it, a set of principles and modes of governance so ingrained as to
constitute the common sense of the age.
A. Defining Neoliberalism
1. Historical Instantiation
Neoliberalism is perhaps most readily associated with its historic emergence
in the policy platforms of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and with the
subsequent iteration of market fundamentalism known as the “Washington
67
Consensus.” These regimes focused their political platforms on deregulation,
the creation of stable and well-protected private-law systems, and the
dismantling of the welfare state—shifting the primary role of government from
68
public law to private law.
This shift is particularly evident in the law and development context. In

65. See Daria Roithmayr, A Dangerous Supplement, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 80 (2005) (observing that
critical legal scholars have failed to account for the rise of law and economics and the ways in which the
legal discourse has changed in a globalized world).
66. David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development
Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (arguing
that the rule of law is no longer just an instrument of development, but is now seen as constitutive of
development and thus an end in itself). See also F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 75–76
(Routledge Classics, 2001).
67. See David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 22 (2007) (offering detailed and insightful account of neoliberalism’s historic emergence
under Reagan and Thatcher). Regarding the Washington Consensus, see John Williamson, What
Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN READJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS
HAPPENED? 5–20 (John Williamson ed., 1989). Williamson, an economist, coined the term
“Washington Consensus” in an article describing the economic policies routinely prescribed by
Washington to set Latin American countries’ “houses in order” in the wake of the Latin American debt
crisis. Id. at 7. The consensus Williamson describes is between the “political Washington” of Congress
and the White House, and the “‘technocratic Washington’ of international financial institutions, the
economic agencies of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, and think tanks.” The ten policy
instruments Williamson identifies as routinely prescribed include: deregulation, austerity measures,
privatization, and trade policy. Id. at 7–18.
68. David Kennedy, The ‘Rule of Law,’ Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 138 (David M. Trubek
& Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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contradistinction to political liberalism, the development focus under
neoliberalism is “less legislative positivism and sovereignty than private rights
69
and neoformalism about the limits of public law.” For example, during the
postwar liberal consensus, law was seen as “subordinate to social purposes—
implementing, fulfilling, and accomplishing the objectives of the society, rather
than expressing a priori limits or historic commitments to be respected or
70
purposes of its own to be achieved.” But with the advent of the Washington
Consensus, law was relegated to well-defined tasks—the creation of stable and
well-protected property rights, enforcement of private contracts, and limitation
of the arbitrary exercise of government power—enabling a particular ideal of
71
entrepreneurial liberty, not visions of society.
It is also important to note that the emergence of neoliberalism is
72
historically intertwined with the processes of globalization. The increased flow
of global capital and the lowering of barriers to trade and communication are
material changes inextricable from many of the ideological developments
73
surrounding the role of the nation-state examined in this article.
2. As A Political Rationality
Neoliberalism as a political rationality, not a historical development, is what
74
is of particular importance for understanding the decline of legal theory.
Neoliberalism is more principled and totalizing than a mere policy platform, but
it is also not reducible to a set of philosophical ideas; it is embodied in the mode

69. Id.
70. Kennedy, supra note 68, at 102. See also David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in SelfEstrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974
WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1073 (1974) (“[Development under liberalism] offered more than increased
rationality and material satisfaction; it also promised greater equality, enhanced freedom, and fuller
participation.”) (footnotes omitted).
71. Kennedy, supra note 68, at 128–37 .
72. Stuart Hall, et al., After Neoliberalism: Analysing the Present, 53 SOUNDINGS 8, 10 (2013)
(“The particular global character of neoliberalism was part of its initiating armoury—for instance
through the Washington Consensus from the 1980s onwards—and it is also an element of its historical
specificity.”) Unfortunately, globalization, a contested concept in its own right, is beyond the scope of
this article. However, it too needs to be incorporated into the theoretical conversation; legal theory has
not fully accounted for the more concrete changes brought about by this paradigm shift either. See
generally Ralf Michaels, Globalisation and Law: Law Beyond the State, in LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY
287–303 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2013) (illustrating that globalization has not been
sufficiently accounted for or incorporated into legal thought and examining possible reasons for its
exclusion).
73. In particular there is a changing role for the nation-state in the globalized world. For example,
in relation to transnational corporations, if the primary responsibility of the sovereign is to preserve
market stability and growth, its ability to exert power against a corporation is limited by the potential
harm to the economy if that corporation leaves to find in pursuit of a more favorable regulatory
environment.
74. A “political rationality” refers to the discursive logic that legitimates exercises of power—it
structures the common language of policy debates as well as limits the field of possible government
action. It extends beyond the traditional concept of the state and focuses instead on Michel Foucault’s
concept of “governmentality,” which encompasses a much broader understanding of the relationship
between thought and the exercise of power.
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of governance. It is a set of principles that have been so incorporated into the
experience of the world that the dominant discourse no longer sees them as
points of contention. As I argue below, this is what it means to recognize
neoliberalism as hegemonic: it has become the common sense of the current
moment, and as a result, many of its assumptions have been rendered invisible
in the literature.
Although neoliberalism has only attained hegemonic status in the last thirty
years, the foundational tenets of its current iteration grow out of the much
earlier work of Friedrich Hayek. I engage with Hayek’s work directly for two
reasons. First, Hayek remains one of the strongest and most cogent defenders
75
of neoliberal rationality. Second, Hayek lays out explicitly what has become
implicit or assumed in the current discourse. Silences occur insofar as any
paradigm becomes hegemonic and constitutes the common sense of an era.
Looking at the current discourse in light of Hayek’s work will therefore render
76
its underlying rationale visible.
a. Circumscribed role for the state—Hayek’s view of the cosmos. In
founding the neoliberal thought collective, Hayek and the other members of the
Mont Pelerin Society did not intend to revive classical economic liberalism
unchanged. For one, under neoliberalism the government has an active role in
supporting the market and correcting market failures, diverging from the
government’s role in classical laissez-faire economics. Neoliberalism is also
distinct insofar as it portrays both the market and rational economic behavior as
requiring the law and “the dissemination of social norms designed to facilitate
competition, free trade, and rational economic action on the part of every
77
member and institution of society” to function properly. To fully understand
these differences, one must begin with Hayek’s vision of civil society and the
state.
In Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Hayek describes civil society and the
market as “spontaneous orders” (or cosmos) to indicate that, despite being
78
products of human action, they are not the product of human design. The
complexity of these systems, he argues, is beyond the capacity of human

75. PHILLIP MIROWSKI & DIETER PLEHWE, THE ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN: THE MAKING OF
NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 158 (2009) (describing Hayek’s role in founding both the
Chicago School and the Mont Pelerin Society).
76. Conaghan, supra note 41, at 465 (“The neoliberal guru Friedrich Hayek began writing in the
1940s and 1950s, developing the theoretical ideas that were eventually to form the basis of
neoliberalism—ideas that were widely regarded as wholly unacceptable in the political environment of
post-war Keynesian welfarism.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Susan George, A Short History of
Neoliberalism: Twenty Years of Elite Economics and Emerging Opportunities for Structural Change, in
GLOBAL FINANCE: NEW THINKING ON REGULATING SPECULATIVE CAPITAL MARKETS 27, 27 (2000).
77. Brown, supra note 14, at 41. See also STUART HALL, THE HARD ROAD TO RENEWAL:
THATCHERISM AND THE CRISIS OF THE LEFT (1988) (a remarkable account of the extent to which
Margaret Thatcher appropriated culture and society as a political battleground).
78. F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOL. 1: RULES & ORDER 38 (University of
Chicago Press, 1981) [hereinafter HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOL. 1].
THE
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knowledge, such that one cannot know the impact of attempts to intervene or
79
change a spontaneous order. Thus, the market should be seen as a highly
interdependent and balanced ecology that even well-intentioned, seemingly
benign projects can harmfully disrupt. Consequently, Hayek argues,
government should never intervene directly in the logic of the market because it
can “never be aware of all the costs of achieving particular results by such
80
interference.” Implicit in this formulation is the idea that even noneconomic
social programs may have economic consequences that cannot be known ex
ante, and so Hayek concludes, it “is not in our power to build a desirable society
by simply putting together the particular elements that by themselves appear
81
desirable.” And, with that, the Hayekian model refutes not the desirability of
pursuing loftier social goals, but the possibility of pursuing that common good
effectively, especially with regard to material inequality. According to this
theory, the role of law and its goals must remain formal—never substantive.
Governmental pursuit of substantive ideals, even if widely shared, leads to
market inefficiencies and other unintended consequences. Hayek famously
cautioned, “the sources of many of the most harmful agents in this world are
82
often not evil men but highminded idealists.”
83
In Hayek’s framework, therefore, the law is subordinated to the market.
Law builds the architecture for the market but does so responsively to this
naturally occurring order. Or, to put it another way, government makes the
legal framework but not as it pleases. Under neoliberalism the central question
for national policy to determine is “which government actions support[] and
which impede[] market activity, and to prioritize and order market supporting
84
initiatives in the most effective way.”
Hayek’s metaphor of civil society as a factory illustrates law’s subordinate
role in his theory very clearly. In this passage, he emphasizes the importance of
law, stating that its coercive function makes law more than just another part of
the factory’s machinery; it establishes law as a condition for the preservation
85
(and optimization) of that order. However, in extending this metaphor, he
analogizes the proper role of the state not to the managers in the factory (as one

79. Id. at 51 (The limits of human knowledge, Hayek argues, are even more pronounced when
diffused among members of a government structure).
80. Id. at 57.
81. Id. at 56 (“From the insight that the benefits of civilization rest on the use of more knowledge
than can be used in any deliberately concerted effort, it follows that it is not in our power to build a
desirable society by simply putting together the particular elements that by themselves appear
desirable.”).
82. Id. at 70.
83. This provides Hayek’s definition of the rule of law: “Stripped of all technicalities [the Rule of
Law] means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in
given circumstances, and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.” HAYEK, supra
note 66, at 75–76 (citing A.V. Dicey’s THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION).
84. Kennedy, supra note 68, at 132.
85. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOL. 1, supra note 78, at 47–48.
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might expect), but to the maintenance workers, stating, government’s role, like
the maintenance worker’s, does not entail production of any particular goods or
services for the citizens. The role of law is “rather to see that the mechanism
which regulates the production of those goods and services is kept in working
86
order.”
b. Legitimacy and dedemocratization. The neoliberal framework,
premised on the impossibility of enacting a collective substantive vision, clearly
cannot ground the state’s legitimacy in democratic authority and pursuit of the
common good the way liberalism does. The state’s legitimacy, therefore, is
87
“based upon its ability to create conditions for individual flourishing.” The
government’s role regarding the market is not always to stay its hand, in
contrast to the model in classical economic liberalism. The metric for measuring
the sovereign becomes the degree to which the sovereign successfully fulfills
this role of not interfering until such a time as the market dictates state
intervention is necessary to preserve individual liberty.
This model of legitimacy is not only a deviation from the ideal of democratic
authority but is actively hostile to the intervention of democratic will in certain
areas. Governance by majority rule is seen as a potential threat to individual
rights and constitutional liberties. Democracy is viewed as a luxury, only
possible under conditions of relative affluence coupled with a strong middle88
class presence to guarantee political stability. What can be left to democratic
politics is therefore limited, and an ever-increasing number of areas are seen as
the exclusive province of private individuals or the technocratic administrative
89
state.
c. No society, just individuals—no demos, just an aggregate. The shift from
the collective to the individual as the unit of governance entails a shift from a
representative democracy to an aggregate one. To again quote Margaret
90
Thatcher, “There is no such thing as society.” The subject that Thatcher
envisioned for Britain is an entrepreneur capable of making her own way, and a
consumer who rationally chooses among a set of options, not a citizen who joins
with other citizens to pursue a vision of society. This is in accordance with
Hayek’s theory: The individual is capable of pursuing only her own interests
because the limits of human knowledge are such that she cannot take the
interests of others into account. If everyone pursues their own interests, the
86. Id. at 47.
87. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN A. FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 149 (2006) (describing this change as a slide into the “consumerist
constitution”).
88. Harvey, supra note 67, at 66.
89. Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From Political to
Economic Constitutionalism? 8 CONSTELLATIONS 442, 453–54 (2001) (Neoliberal constitutionalism
seeks to put “certain market regulatory institutions beyond the reach of transitory political majorities . .
. . developing a politics of anti-politics.”).
90. Thatcher, supra note 13.
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story goes, the market will function efficiently (not be distorted) and will result
91
in a just allocation. Competition is the central virtue, and solidarity among
92
individuals is a sign of weakness and a manipulation of that virtuous form.
The role of the state vis-à-vis the individual is likewise recast. With this
neoliberal conception of the subject comes the assumption that the subject
alone bears responsibility for the consequences of her actions. In this culture of
personal responsibility, the subject’s “moral autonomy is measured by [her]
capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for [her] own needs and service
93
[her] own ambitions.” The neoliberal model of choice does not recognize the
material constraints that limit an individual’s choices because those constraints
are seen as merely the product of her previous choices. The government is
limited to enabling people access to the markets such that they can use their
own skills and abilities to pursue their own interests. The state is not
responsible if individuals do not properly respond to the market’s incentive
structures, but it is responsible for the pernicious consequences of sheltering
94
individuals from the market’s disciplinary effects. President Reagan,
accordingly, decried social welfare as a program “enacted in the name of
compassion that degrade[s] the moral worth of work, encourage[s] family
break-ups, and drive[s] entire communities into a bleak and heartless
95
dependency.”
B. Neoliberal Hegemony
Given that the historic rise of neoliberalism (conceived as a series of policies
and political projects) coincided directly with the halcyon days of critical legal
theory in the 1970s and 1980s, how can I contend that it also explains the loss of
the crits’ vitality in subsequent decades? The answer is through an
96
understanding of hegemony. It is not the particular instantiations of neoliberal
97
thought that critical legal theory has failed to apprehend and address, but
98
rather, its hegemonic nature. With a few notable exceptions, the critique of
91. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60–72 (1981).
92. PHILIP MIROWSKI, NEVER LET A SERIOUS CRISIS GO TO WASTE 92 (2013).
93. Brown, supra note 14, at 42.
94. Margaret Thatcher once declared, “Economics are the method; the object is to change the
heart and soul.” Interview for Sunday Times, Mrs. Thatcher: The First Two Years (May 1, 1981),
available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475.
95. Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address (Feb. 4, 1986), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36646.
96. During the Reagan–Thatcher era, neoliberalism was the dominant paradigm but was not yet
hegemonic. Stuart Hall, Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al., 151 NEW LEFT REVIEW 115,
120 (1985) [hereinafter Hall, Authoritarian Populism.].
97. For example, CLS offered an incisive critique of law and economics, exposing much of the
logic I am describing: See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 769 (1979); Mark
Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 669 (1978–79); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1979).
98. Bernard Harcourt, Martha McCluskey, and a number of scholars working in comparative law
and law and development are among these exceptions in the American legal academy.
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neoliberalism as a political rationality has been excluded from the legal
academy generally, despite its prominence in related fields such as political and
critical theory.
Hegemony is most concisely defined as constituting the “common sense” of
99
an age. A paradigm’s status as common sense indicates more than its
ubiquity—it indicates a particular form of power:
You cannot learn, through common sense, how things are: you can only discover
where they fit into the existing scheme of things. In this way, its very taken-forgrantedness is what establishes it as a medium in which its own premises
and
100
presuppositions are being rendered invisible by its apparent transparency.

Not every successful or even dominant paradigm attains such widespread
acceptance as to constitute the ground on which most political conversations
from both the left and the right stand, but this is precisely what it means to say
101
that a paradigm has become “hegemonic.” No longer merely a theory or even
an ideology, its ideas become inseparable from a set of actions, institutions, and
102
a mode of governance. Hegemony’s power works through consent, not
persuasion; it does not entail rejection of an alternative on principle, but an
assumption of the impossibility of an alternative. Furthermore, in the realm of
ideas, it is as much, if not more, about what one cannot say—what is not legible
or “rational”—than openly articulated “ideological” claims. It entails the
cleansing of the public discourse of certain claims. For instance, “Thatcherism
103
made it part of the common sense that you can’t calculate common interest.”
Hegemony functions not only through internalized common sense but also
through a “scholastic program” (a set of principles advanced by a sector of
104
intellectuals). Although neoliberal rationality should not be reduced to or
conflated with the theory of law and economics, the latter’s meteoric rise and
proliferation within the legal academy are undeniably symptomatic of
neoliberalism’s dominance, as well as an instrument of its dissemination.
Therefore, law and economics provides insight into the functioning of this

99. This understanding of cultural hegemony is rooted in the work of Antonio Gramsci and Stuart
Hall. Hall, Authoritarian Populism, supra note 96. See also Edward Greer, Antonio Gramsci and “Legal
Hegemony,” in THE POLITICS OF LAW 304–09 (David Kairys ed., 1st ed. 1982).
100. Stuart Hall, Culture, the Media, and the Ideological Effect, in MASS COMMUNICATION AND
SOCIETY 315, 326 (James Curran et al. eds., 1979).
101. I do not mean to imply absolute closure. Hegemony is always at least to some degree contested
and contestable—the hegemonic paradigm always contains contradictions and resistances within it.
102. The concept of hegemony refuses the distinction of the realm of ideas and the material
relations undergirding those ideas. Therefore, although due to my focus on the discourses surrounding
legal theory’s decline, I am foregrounding the political-ideological dimension of hegemony, in
accordance with Antonio Gramsci’s articulation of the concept, and Stuart Hall’s further elaboration of
it, I believe firmly in the historical and materialist aspects of hegemony: “[hegemony is] impossible to
conceptualize or achieve without ‘the decisive nucleus of economic activity.’” Hall, supra note 96, at
120. And so this story of neoliberalism’s hegemonic rise is incomplete without an account of the process
of economic globalization; however, it is beyond the scope of this discursive project.
103. Stuart Hall & Doreen Massey, Interpreting the Crisis, in THE NEOLIBERAL CRISIS 55, 59
(Jonathan Rutherford & Sally Davison eds., 2012).
104. CARL BOGGS, GRAMSCI’S MARXISM 39 (1976).
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scholastic program. For one, it is important to recognize the nexus of money
and prestige in the legal academy undergirding law and economics’ ascent,
because to elide the two reinforces “a liberal convention of awkward silence
105
about the political economy of legal theory.” The most obvious example is the
Olin Foundation, which had a profound role in bringing the law and economics
106
movement into elite law schools.
However, as important as the law and economics movement has been to the
championing of neoliberal ideology, the more profound effects of neoliberalism
in the academy have occurred in those areas that are not immediately
recognized as law and economics scholarship. In those areas this rationality has
107
huge but unrecognized and therefore uncontested influence. Neoliberalism’s
power, therefore, is at least partially derived from its invisibility.
On one level, neoliberalism’s hegemony is the premise for my project: legal
theory has failed to recognize a hegemonic shift—it has failed to historicize its
project and recognize that the dominant legal paradigm has changed. But on
another level, hegemony itself is what legal theory has missed, treating
instantiations of neoliberal rationality as distinct theories or models. Failure to
recognize hegemony on this level means neglecting to put the pieces together to
reveal the larger logic, and a failure to see the depth of its entrenchment.
Critical legal scholars may have offered incisive critiques of law and economics
as a theory, but they failed to recognize some of its tenets as organizing much
more of our world and inherent in a far broader swath of legal scholarship than
law and economics.
V
LEGAL THEORY THROUGH THE LENS OF NEOLIBERALISM: A
SYMPTOMATOLOGY
Viewing the narratives of decline in light of neoliberalism allows one to
reconcile their contradictions—to see each narrative as true on its own terms
and yet incomplete for understanding the fate of critical legal theory. In this

105. Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking With Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s Rise, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1229 (2006).
106. Id. at 1215 (“By the end of the twentieth century, the Olin Foundation, under William E.
Simon's leadership, had made an ‘investment’ of around $50 million in ‘law-and-economics’
scholarship.” (citing WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR REFLECTION: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 272
(2004)). See also id. at 1215–22 (describing the more aggressive strategies of conservative foundations
as compared to their liberal or left-leaning counterparts); STEPHEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 103, 182–91 (2008)
(detailing the role of the Olin Foundation in the rise of law and economics and the founding of George
Mason Law School as a specialized law school for law and economics research).
107. Michael D. Murray, After the Great Recession: Law and Economics’ Topics of Invention and
Arrangement & Tropes of Style, 58 LOY. L. REV. 897. 919 (2012). See also Michael D. Murray, The
Great Recession and the Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics, 58 LOY. L. REV. 615, 619 (“The
fact that law and economics is persuasive beyond the confirmed members of the discipline is supported
by modern history: critics and supporters alike agree that law and economics has established itself as
the dominant and most influential contemporary mode of analysis among American legal scholars.”).
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part, I argue that each narrative should be understood as a symptom of
neoliberalism’s rise. To read the narratives symptomatically means to take each
of them as offering a descriptive insight but to not accept any of them as
identifying the fundamental cause of legal theory’s decline. I proceed in order
through the narratives to illustrate the ways in which each reflects, without
108
explicitly recognizing and accounting for, neoliberalism’s logic. In short, I will
read these narratives of decline as constituting a symptomatology.
A. Re-evaluating “Victory”
The victory narrative focuses on the incorporation of three of the crits’
primary critiques into contemporary mainstream accounts: (1) the
indeterminacy critique, (2) the refutation of the law–politics distinction, and (3)
the critique of the legal subject and other universal principles in liberal theory.
These were the three sites where the crits found traction with respect to legal
liberalism. Part III addressed the compatibility of the indeterminacy critique
109
with law and economics. Therefore, this part focuses on the commensurability
of the other two critiques with neoliberalism’s logic. However, under
neoliberalism, the rules of the game have changed, and these critiques, once
110
radical, are no longer truly oppositional. Thus, the shift from liberalism to
neoliberalism explains why these critiques could be folded into mainstream
accounts without threatening the law’s legitimacy, and also why the crits’
supposed “victory” feels so hollow.
1. New Legitimacy and the Law–Politics Distinction
A new model of legal legitimacy under neoliberalism provides insight into
why the dissolution of the law–politics distinction and the critique of the legal
subject could be folded into the contemporary dominant discourse without
problem or questions when under the liberal paradigm they constituted a form
of radical critique. In short, by altering the very terms of the law’s legitimacy
this paradigm shift cuts the legs out from under the critique of the law–politics
distinction and neuters the once incisive critique of the myth of the autonomous
liberal subject.

108. Constructing a symptomatology from these narratives exposes, among other things, that
neoliberalism is not a reality that critical legal theory has already recognized and accounted for, as one
might be inclined to believe. That the crits offered critiques that exposed and challenged what I have
identified as neoliberal rationality in specific law and economics theories or models is not equal to the
kind of recognition and reckoning I am advocating. The narratives of decline show that critical legal
scholars today are not seeing the whole picture even when they effectively critique the logic in
circumscribed ways.
109. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. See also Eric Engle, The Fake Revolution:
Understanding Legal Realism, 47 WASHBURN L. REV. 653, 666 (2008) (describing law and economics as
taming of the radical potential of the crits’ indeterminacy critique “as an instrumentality of the very
capitalism, which it had only recently, if briefly, questioned”).
110. For a general discussion of the confluence of Hayek’s theories and CLS’s critiques written by a
law and economics scholar see Linda A. Schwartzstein, Austrian Economics and the Current Debate
between Critical Legal Studies and Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105 (1992).
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Under liberalism, the freedom, rationality, and participation of the
autonomous citizen-subject in the democratic process were the grounds of the
111
state’s democratic legitimacy. Each time the state actively intervened on
behalf of capital, for example, there was potential for a “legitimation crisis”—
law’s claims of neutrality were undermined as it was shown to be serving
112
interests other than those sanctioned by the governed. Under the neoliberal
paradigm, in contrast, the state’s intervention on behalf of capital is no longer
an exploitable moment for critique: “[Independence from social and economic
powers] is the criterion for legitimacy that neoliberalism overcomes by casting
113
the state as an extension of the market . . . or a form of the market.” Market
growth is the precondition of individual flourishing and the state should
intervene on behalf of capital to preserve this liberty of its subjects. Therefore,
law is not something that stands above politics, responsive only to the
democratic process; it is something that can be used tactically in service of
political or economic interests so long as it preserves the market and the liberty
of its subjects.
Critique of liberalism’s myth of the whole, rational, and politically engaged
subject is likewise less salient because the authority of the state is no longer
grounded in democratic authority but in its duty to enable this particular model
114
of entrepreneurial liberty. Although antidemocratic in a theoretical sense
because the government wields authority not expressly granted to it by the
people, this vision of government is generally accepted by the populace at
115
large.
The extent to which that state cares for or responds to its subjects has also
111. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 53 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980)
(“And thus that, which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent
of any number of freeman capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society.”)
112. Brown, supra note 14, at 143 n.6.
113. Id.
114. The economy is the top issue cited by voters in determining how they cast their ballots,
followed closely by unemployment. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Economy is Paramount Issue to U.S. Voters,
GALLUP (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/153029/economy-paramount-issue-voters.aspx (In
the 2012 presidential election, more than nine out of ten voters reported that the economy was
“extremely important” or “very important” to their vote).
115. Two recent studies illustrate the extent that the mindset regarding inequality has shifted and
the neoliberal suspicion of big government has taken hold. A recent poll conducted by Bloomberg
found that although Americans almost two to one (64 to 33 percent) say that the United States no
longer offers everyone the equal chance to get ahead (the social mobility that has for so long be core of
the so-called “American dream”), 44 percent of Americans still think it would be better for the market
to be allowed operate freely than to have the government intervene even if that means the gap gets
wider. See David J. Lynch, Americans Say Dream Fading as Income Gap Hurts Chances, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 11, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-11/americans-say-dream-fadingas-income-gap-hurts-chances.html. This faith in the market in spite of its consequences is part and
parcel of neoliberal rationality. A recent Gallup poll paints an even starker picture of the acceptance of
neoliberal premises by members of both political parties. The poll indicates that 72 percent of
Americans believe “big government” is the greatest threat to country in the future, the highest
percentage ever recorded by a significant margin. Jeffrey M. Jones, Record High in U.S. Say Big
Government Greatest Threat, GALLUP, (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/166535/record-highsay-big-government-greatest-threat.aspx.
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been displaced as a central metric for measuring its efficacy or legitimacy. In the
shift from the nation-state to the market-state, the question is no longer one of
whether the government improves the welfare of the people, but is instead
“whether [the government’s] policies improve and expand the opportunities
116
offered to the public.” Illustrating that the state is not improving the welfare
of its subjects is no longer destabilizing because responsibility has been shifted
down to the individual.
Exposing the distance between liberal ideals and current realities (the
materialist critique) has lost some of its force because neoliberalism has
redefined these ideals in such a way as to give the illusion of achievement. The
concept of equality is a clear example: liberalism did not have a means to
explain the gap between formal equality and substantive equality and therefore
could be called into question on those grounds (as the crits did very
117
effectively). Neoliberalism, by contrast, has an answer; it redefines equality as
equal choice (or equal amounts of entrepreneurial liberty) and places any
failures in that arena firmly with the individual. One’s choices are restricted by
one’s own merit and by one’s prior choices, not by systemic or structural
inequalities. Because neoliberalism redefines such liberal concepts, as opposed
to jettisoning them, there is an illusion of continuity: if neoliberalism openly
disavowed the importance of the ideal then it would register as a break. Instead,
neoliberalism redefines all other values in terms of liberty, which obfuscates this
change, making many believe it in fact preserves these liberal values when it
meets its own criteria.
That class falls out of the victory narrative is also symptomatic of the shift in
logic that makes material inequalities not the product of law but of individual
choices. If material inequality is the product of individual choices and talents,
law is no longer responsible for addressing the resulting inequalities.
Furthermore, according to Hayek’s theory, the state is not capable of
successfully intervening in the economic realm even if the market’s allocations
are unjust.
2. Multiculturalism and the Critique of Universals
The current “multiculturalism” of the legal academy is sometimes held up as
another victory for critical legal scholarship: “The legal academy has been
transformed, with a strong ideology of liberal centrism displaced by an almost
equally strong pluralist ideology that tolerates a range of ideas wide enough to
encompass those that would have been called critical legal studies at an earlier
118
point.” Much of the leftist critique in the second half of the twentieth century
was indeed focused on debunking the illusion of universal values, revealing how
claims to universality furthered the values of the dominant race, class, or
116. Brown, supra note 14, at 222.
117. See David Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
118. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 111.
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gender. Neoliberalism’s abandonment of these claims to universality, and even
more so its embrace of their impossibility, provides insight into why these
critiques no longer have the force they once did.
The refutation of universal values is a premise shared between the critical
119
legal project and neoliberalism. Hayek’s vision of the neoliberal state is
explicitly premised on the impossibility of enacting a monolithic set of shared
social values; he draws his distinction between the market state and the
collectivist state precisely along these lines. The market state has the virtue of
not needing to appeal to transcendent values, Hayek argues, whereas
collectivist frameworks presuppose “the existence of a complete ethical code in
120
which all the different human values are allotted their due place.” The
neoliberal state invokes a pluralist society in which each group can pursue its
own values and interests, which are then merely aggregated. This is particularly
appealing in the age of identify politics and the recognition of difference. More
than not requiring it, neoliberalism capitalizes on our experience of the
impossibility of value consensus. Thus, the legal academy’s multiculturalism can
be as a symptom of neoliberalism’s rationality.
B. “There Is No Alternative”: Rethinking The Failure Narrative
Failure to provide an alternative, one of the central indictments of the crits,
reflects both a formal and substantive element of neoliberal hegemony: the
absence of any alternative. As an initial matter, the inability to offer an
alternative is a formal aspect of neoliberal hegemony insofar as hegemony
functions as common sense, denying the possibility of another logic. But the
absence of an alternative is a substantive premise of neoliberalism as well.
121
Margaret Thatcher even coined the slogan: TINA (“there is no alternative”).
Furthermore, in Hayek’s theory, limits on societal knowledge, combined with
the delicate ecology of the spontaneous order of society and the market, make
ambitions to seek out an alternative not only futile but also potentially
destructive. The crits failed to offer an alternative to capitalist democracy, but
they did so precisely at this “end of history” moment when the possibility of an
alternative itself is being denied, and from which it is easier to imagine the end
122
of the world than the end of market capitalism.
This assumption that there is no alternative to the democratic market-state

119. See Jodi Melamed, The Spirit of Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal
Multiculturalism, in 24 SOCIAL TEXT 4, 3–8 (Winter 2006).
120. HAYEK, supra note 66, at 60.
121. The original source of the slogan was Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, notably mentioned in
Holmes’s vitriolic dissent in Lochner v. New York. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (In refusing the majority’s assertion that freedom of contract was a
fundamental liberty, he declared, “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s
Social Statics.”).
122. FREDRIC JAMESON, THE SEEDS OF TIME xii (1996) (“It seems to be easier for us today to
imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of nature than the breakdown of late
capitalism.”).
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gives rise to the demand that legal scholarship work within the given framework
as opposed to attempting to challenge or think outside of it. The instrumentalist
demand for legal scholarship to be “useful” can therefore also be seen as
symptomatic of neoliberal hegemony. This demand is not only directed toward
the crits but throughout the legal academy, as legal academics eschew theory,
reflexivity, and critique in favor of applied and technocratic projects that
123
function within the system. “The message of neoliberalism is one that values
applied knowledge over theoretical or doctrinal knowledge—‘know how’ over
‘know what’. . . . Critical and theoretical knowledge of all kinds has been
124
contracted in favor of vocationalism.” Instrumental forms of legal scholarship
are more successful within the academic market, especially as the academy is
125
pressured to focus more on supporting the legal profession at large.
Identifying this relationship between instrumentalism and neoliberalism also
provides insight into why the specialization narrative is symptomatic. Hackney’s
“toolkit” metaphor puts a positive valence on the characterization of theories as
instruments. The abandonment of legal theory as its own field in favor of
concrete applications of theory fits neatly within neoliberalism’s logic that value
only comes from working within the current framework.
C. Putting The Pieces Back Together: The Contingency Of The Identity–Class
Opposition
The balkanization narrative asserts that materialist and class politics were
abandoned in favor of identity projects through the rise of CRT and feminist
126
legal theory. In so doing, this narrative assumes a fundamental antagonism
between materialist-distributive concerns and identity politics. This binary is
again symptomatic of neoliberal thought. The crits did break apart into
theoretical subfields along these lines; but the antagonism between projects of
redistribution (class) and recognition (identity) is historically contingent. The
perceived incompatibility is premised on a separation of the cultural from the
economic at the heart of neoliberalism; prior to the rise of neoliberalism
materialist and identity politics were seen as fully compatible.
A conception of identity divorced from materiality is compatible with, if not
constituent of, neoliberal logic. Under neoliberalism there is an emerging
“rhetorical commitment to diversity, and to a narrow, formal, non-redistributive
127
form of ‘equality’ politics for the new millennium.” However, it does not
123. Margaret Thornton, The New Knowledge Economy and the Transformation of the Law
Discipline, 19 INT’L J. OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 265, 273 (2012).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews that Lawyers Love to Hate, NY TIMES (Oct. 21,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/law-scholarships-lackluster-reviews.html; David Segal,
What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, NY TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html.
126. See supra notes 47– 49 and accompanying text.
127. LISA DUGGAN, TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY?: NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND THE
ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 44 (2003).

BLALOCK_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX

96

12/3/2014 2:08 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 77:71

follow that all identity claims or claims of recognition are inherently compatible
with neoliberalism and therefore necessarily complicit in its logic. Nancy Fraser
argues that although the conflict between the two is not a natural or necessary
128
relation. She argues that the solution is not to abandon identity claims
because certain forms of “recognition” are truly emancipatory and because
culture is a necessary terrain of struggle. “[R]ecognition” can retain and
129
integrate the materialist issues of redistribution.
That said, currently, identity is eclipsing the materialist conversation. Insofar
as the identity discourses enable people to identify themselves as socially
progressive but fiscally conservative, they reinforce the neoliberal construction
that these are in fact distinct realms—that the social can be divorced from the
economic. This is the position the Court has taken, and the legal academy has
followed suit. An examination of the equal protection doctrine illustrates this
point.
The legacy of the Warren Court has been taken up in the popular
consciousness and, more importantly, in the legal academy as being about the
130
protection of “insular minorities” or identity groups. However, in focusing on
this debate, legal scholars have not preserved the Warren Court’s concept of
131
protection. “[T]oday in modern America, inequality is discussed as the natural
byproduct of the differing interests, talents, and education that individuals bring
to that mysterious thing political economists and neo-classical economists alike
132
refer to as the ‘market.’” Even in terms of affirmative action or welfare, the
focus is on enabling the traditionally excluded group’s participation in the
market. How did society go from a moment in which even the Supreme Court
appeared to be laying the groundwork for the poor to be considered a suspect
class to one in which the poor are excluded not only from the equal protection
doctrine, but from legal theory discourse as well? Materialism may have fallen
out of the Court’s equal protection analysis, but that is not a justification for
legal scholarship to accept its exclusion. The legal academy is participating in
the ideology of erasure insofar as the academy has accepted and reinforces that
disparate impact and other materially inflected concepts of equal protection are

128. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, NEW LEFT REVIEW 108–09 (2000). Fraser identifies a
proliferation of “recognition claims” and the displacement of redistribution claims in the face of
neoliberalism’s rhetorical assault, the end of socialism, and doubts about even the possibility of stateKeynesian social democracy in the face of globalization. Id. at 108.
129. Id.
130. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004). In recent years, leftist legal
scholars have fought to preserve and even expand the equal protection of identity-based minorities
under an antisubordination rubric as opposed to a colorblind rubric.
131. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (carefully illustrating that the rejection of material
considerations in favor of a focus on the intention to discriminate was not necessarily the path laid out
by the Warren Court).
132. Athena Mutua, Introducing Class Crits: From Class Blindness to a Critical Legal Analysis of
Economic Inequality, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 859, 861 (2008).
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133

“off the wall.”

VI
RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE?
The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit
together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions
they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the
three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars
today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative
and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely
an ebb in the regular cycles of theory.
A. Prescription: More Politics
The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a
greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects,
especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an
issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in
134
favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways. One can
certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of
135
explicitly conservative legal theory and methods and concern that left-leaning
136
legal academics have not taken up this charge. However, this demand for
political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current
frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles,
persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore
counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory.
Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of

133. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong on the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism,
85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 679 (2005) (“[C]onventions determining what is a good or bad legal argument
about the Constitution, what is a plausible legal claim, and what is ‘off-the-wall’ change over time in
response to changing social, political, and historical conditions”).
134. See, e.g., Siedman, supra note 31, at 588–92 (advocating for current critical legal scholars to
form political alliances with rule-of-law liberals and conservatives against creeping authoritarianism);
Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent Writing About Race,
82 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2003) (book review) (urging CRT to turn away from high theory and discourse
about racial justice to focus on strategies for harnessing and redirecting the material interests of those
who benefit from white privilege).
135. McCluskey, supra note 105, at 1194 (“An explosion of visionary legal theory challenging a
century of non-conservative law reform has helped drive the right-wing’s political success.”). See
generally TELES, supra note 106 (describing in detail the rise of the conservative legal movement,
starting in the 1970s through present day).
136. See Simon, supra note 2, at 181 (arguing that “the cost of the antipolitcal impulse in the liberal
academy has been the diminution in the intellectual resources available for nonconservative politics”);
see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020
33 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (arguing the left has much to learn from the right in
this regard: “The recent conservative mobilization teaches that authority flows to those who can relate
the Constitution’s fundamental commitments to the beliefs and concerns that animate the American
people and who can identify those modes of argument that this vision its most powerful legal form.”).
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what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of
theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental
137
move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor,
many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the
Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should
ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace
138
materialist claims or reify forms of identity. Full recognition of same-sex
marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area
where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area
also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the
current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on
identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in
which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a
139
number of blatantly neoliberal positions.
Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to
those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal
140
profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms. In this way, the
focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable
141
capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,” which has only become
more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as
instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter
hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours
of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone
of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical
legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even
known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s
marginalization.
B. Prescription: More Normativity
Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics
137. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
138. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Am. Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), in which the Court
held that the “effective vindication” exception does not guarantee the right to class arbitrations even if
the case would be prohibitively expensive for a single party to pursue, such as in antitrust cases.
According to Scalia’s opinion for the majority, access to the courts only has to be hypothetically
possible: “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not
constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.” Id. at 2311. In the Court’s reasoning in
Italian Colors, we see the neoliberal model of choice insofar as it refuses to account for the ways
material realities and inequalities constrain choice; see Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice for Big Business,
NY TIMES (July 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/opinion/justice-for-big-business.html
(“[I]n the final two weeks of [the term in which Windsor was handed down], the Court ruled in favor of
big business and closed the courthouse doors to employees, consumers, and small businesses seeking
remedy for serious injuries.”).
140. Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening, 97
GEO. L.J. 803, 813 (2009).
141. Fischl, supra note 37, at 783.
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that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of
substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and
142
efficiency. This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive
ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will
ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from
neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a
number of pitfalls.
The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose
morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before,
even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above.
Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its
formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality
or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one
can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot
be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality.
The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based
in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example
of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of
Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in
the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the
“distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency
143
over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.
McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the
approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by
arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the
144
societal pie [and] redistribution [is] about dividing it.” “Neoliberalism’s
disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to
the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet
145
treacherous policy separate from efficiency.” In order to challenge this
rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to
promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of
146
social responsibility and community morality.” One must instead recognize
that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality.
Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and
cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace

142. See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 2, at 532 (claiming “if CLS would embrace the moral and spiritual
agenda [he proposes], it would instantly revitalize itself.”); WEST, supra note 61.
143. See generally Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the
Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783 (2003).
144. Id. at 787. Members of CLS did, and some still do, offer precisely the critiques that McCluskey
is advocating however they fail to connect them up to the legal discourse more generally. And CLS
scholars are the ones more than any of the other crits that have been marginalized, relegated to the
clinics, etc.
145. Id. at 787–88.
146. Id. at 798.
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cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt
with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient.
Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological
147
claims. Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain
of discourse or ideology.
Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as
infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society
can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like
Hayek’s theory, “[l]aw and [e]conomics is full of stories about how liberal rights
and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market,
148
undermining its promised rewards.” In light of this, it is a mistake to see
neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it
instead folds them into one another: “[T]he Law and Economics movement is
rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual
149
liberty and popular democracy.” Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not
only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize
neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a
powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive
150
communitarian ideal will win.
Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the
subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to
liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the
existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine
neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the
polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and
independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by [her] capacity for
‘self-care’—the ability to provide for [her] own needs and service [her] own
151
ambitions.” The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but
152
is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”
If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as
“undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not
only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are
right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper
than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the

147. Bernard E. Harcourt, Fantasies and Illusions: On Liberty, Order, Free Markets, 33 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2413, 2422 (2011) (“[The ‘errors’ of law and economics] are not mere mistakes that can easily
be corrected. The belief in free markets has produced a significant redistribution of wealth in society”).
148. McCluskey, supra note 105, at 1267.
149. Gabel, supra note 2, at 529.
150. Harcourt, supra note 147, at 2426 (quoting DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
NEOLIBERALISM 5 (2005)) (“‘Concepts of dignity and individual freedom are powerful and appealing
in their own right. Such ideals empowered the dissident movements in eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union before the end of the Cold War as well as the students in Tiananmen Square.’”).
151. Brown, supra note 14, at 42.
152. Id.
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legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be
countered differently.
More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because
neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities
under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community
may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is
harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted
first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that
neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously.
C. Prescription: Acceptance
The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to
153
dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence. Putting
it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary
moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’
154
revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s. The vitality, this narrative
contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges.
There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it
entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory
does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced;
or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a selffulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and
receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content
with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and
economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently
entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech,
155
equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.
At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in
156
“taking a break from feminism,” but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is
cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the
banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks
157
backward instead of forward. Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be
“self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises
out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate
158
solutions.”
Theory must arise from engagement with the current
153. Schlag, supra note 140 (claiming academic excitement comes in waves).
154. HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 16.
155. Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 195; Zephyr Teachout, Neoliberal Political Law, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 215.
156. See generally HALLEY, supra note 50.
157. See id.
158. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Critical Legal Theory Today, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW
64, 68 (Francis J. Mootz, III ed., 2008) (Balkin continues, “A critical theory of law must recognize how
different aspects of law—and of a critical theory of law itself—become newly salient or refigured in
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circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce
the momentum to move forward.
VII
CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE
The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any
more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should
not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate
the practice of critique within the legal academy.
A. Why Critique
Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit
identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible
connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars
writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming:
critique.
Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must
not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but
instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One
cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one
also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty,
dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the
capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that
neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely
from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal
scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just
demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies
them.
Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation
in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to
refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly
embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law
as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which
one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal
welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can
be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no
alternative.
B. Why It Is Law’s Problem
One might wonder why, if the critique of neoliberalism is vibrant in other
fields (particularly political theory), is it necessary that this critique exist within
different circumstances, and how the seemingly timeless verities of one historical period are
conditioned by the assumptions and expectations of that time.”).
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the legal academy? The answer is that political theory, critical theory, and even
the globalization discourse approach law from the external perspective. Even
within the legal academy, the only really sustained neoliberal critique has been
in the area of law and development—likewise often embodying an external
perspective. And yet, the legal academy and the profession are both premised
on the idea that law cannot be understood fully from the outside. For, one
external critiques tend to address law only in the global sense and do not
account for specific doctrinal developments.
To say that neoliberal critique is legal theory’s task is not to say that it
should be done only at a high level of abstraction. The articles in this volume
are precisely the kind of scholarship that needs to be done: concrete projects
that recognize the effects that neoliberal rationality has in various doctrinal and
theoretical areas.
But more than just being ideally situated to take on this task, neoliberalism
is law’s problem because the law (and the legal academy, by extension) is
complicit in its legitimation. Although based in economics, neoliberalism’s
framework is disseminated and legitimated by the legal discourse: “Law, rather
than economics, has become the rhetorical domain for identifying market
failures and transactional costs, and attending to their elimination, for weighing
and balancing institutional prerogatives, for assessing the proportionality and
159
necessity of regulatory initiatives.” Furthermore, the law serves a legitimating
function insofar as it hides the politics of the market’s logic as merely
160
background rules. “Legal determinations present themselves as operations of
logic, policy analysis, procedural necessity, economic insight, or constitutional
161
commitment.”
Ultimately, critical legal scholarship is still attempting to challenge a legal
discourse that no longer exists. It is attempting to derive political agency from
liberalism’s inconsistencies, but the paradigm of legitimacy for the law has
changed. Although the language may have stayed consistent, the structures are
rationalized anew. Thus far, neoliberal logic has been largely impervious, even
162
in the face of financial crisis when its contradictions were laid bare. Any viable
critique must help to explain this resilience—and to understand law’s role in it.

159. Kennedy, supra note 68, at 161.
160. Bobbitt, supra note 35, at 2382 (“As we enter the Age of Consent, the era of a new, already
emerging constitutional order that puts the maximization of individual choice at the pinnacle of public
policy, it would be well to appreciate the structuring role for choice that American law has always
provided.”).
161. Kennedy, supra note 68, at 163 (offering the example of whether or not a living wage is normal
or abnormal regulatory imposition when framed in legal terms as “obscur[ing] the sense in which these
issues present mutually exclusive political choices”).
162. Hall, et al., supra note 72, at 19 (“[T]he shape of the crisis remains ‘economic’. . . . There is no
serious crisis of ideas.”); see also MIROWSKI, supra note 92.

